feat(terra): qBittorrent confined to a ProtonVPN WireGuard netns
The qBittorrent GUI runs as a system unit inside a `proton` network namespace whose only interface is WireGuard to Proton (NL#490, P2P with NAT-PMP) and whose only route is the tunnel, so a dropped VPN stalls torrents instead of leaking them. DNS goes to Proton's 10.2.0.1, with the host's nscd/resolved sockets hidden since they would answer from the root namespace. A NAT-PMP loop keeps Proton's forwarded port mapped and sets it through the netns-local WebUI. qbittorrent itself is not on PATH: the qbittorrent-vpn launcher and desktop entry (also the magnet/.torrent handler, via a watch folder) start the unit, which polkit lets darman start and stop without a password. The namespace comes up with the GUI and goes away with it. The client is internet-facing, so it is sandboxed too: it sees only its own state, the watch folder, the download dir and read-only theming; the rest of $HOME, /mnt, darman's sops secrets, pass-broker/tailscale sockets and the session bus are gone. The bus would let it run anything through systemd --user, so no tray icon or notifications. Covered by checks.qbittorrent-vpn against a fake Proton peer. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
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sops.age.sshKeyPaths = [ "/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key" ];
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sops.secrets.tailscale_authkey = { };
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sops.secrets.protonvpn_wg_private_key = { };
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sops.secrets.darman_password.neededForUsers = true;
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users.users.darman.hashedPasswordFile = config.sops.secrets.darman_password.path;
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