mars: mirror luna's Obsidian vault to disk with livesync-bridge

Gives the Hermes agent a real directory of markdown for the luna_wiki
vault, at /var/lib/livesync-bridge/vault and mounted into her container at
/opt/data/vault (inside HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT, so she can write, not only
read). Obsidian itself is an Electron GUI with no headless mode, and an
agent wants files rather than an app.

livesync-bridge is Deno, not packaged, and publishes no image — upstream
ships only a `build: .` compose file. So it comes in as a pinned non-flake
input and runs under systemd. Two things that are not obvious:

  - The source is COPIED to a fixed path rather than run from /nix/store.
    Deno keys localStorage — where the bridge records per-file sync state —
    by the main module's origin. Verified by running one source tree from
    two paths against a single DENO_DIR: two origin directories appear. Run
    from the store, every input bump would silently reset both peers to a
    full rescan.
  - It runs as uid 986/gid 983, the same identity the hermes container
    uses. Two uids in a shared group only works while every file stays
    group-writable, and one 0644 file dropped by the agent would stall sync
    on that path.

Talks to CouchDB over the tailnet (jupiter.orbit.sol:5984), so neptun's
vhost, its TLS and its path allowlist are all out of the picture.

Verified before deploying: `deno check` passes on nixpkgs' 2.8.3 (upstream
pins 2.6.9), and the bridge starts, reads LSB_CONFIG, detects a file and
writes its health heartbeat. Both directions confirmed working on mars
afterwards.

Credentials are currently the `obsidian` admin account and the personal
vault's passphrase, which means mars can decrypt every vault database and
not just luna's. Deliberate reuse of what existed; hosts/mars/secrets.nix
records the two independent ways to narrow it.

⚠️ Upstream has three open, unanswered issues on the storage->couchdb
direction (#50, #23, #46) and all fail silently — the log reports the
upload and the database is never updated. Do not treat this directory as
durable storage for anything luna cannot regenerate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TLN5nkLBtCciD3ZnUwtw2b

README.md

@@ -427,6 +427,93 @@ another way in.
   (via the `/mnt/jupiter` samba mount) before the first switch if you want
   it preserved instead of starting clean.
 
+### Obsidian vaults (jupiter CouchDB + mars bridge)
+
+CouchDB itself is fully declarative (`services/dev/obsidian-livesync.nix`), but
+three things are runtime state it cannot own.
+
+**1. Each vault's database is created by the plugin.** Point Self-hosted
+LiveSync at `https://notes.mgaction.town` (URI field) with the database name in
+its own field — *not* as a path on the URI. Turn on End-to-End Encryption and
+Obfuscate Properties **before the first sync**; both are remote-format
+decisions and changing them later means converting or rebuilding the database.
+The passphrase lives in the HomeLab Proton Pass vault, never in sops — it is
+what keeps a publicly reachable database from being a readable one.
+
+Database names must start with a lowercase letter (`a-z0-9_$()+-` after that).
+An illegal name is rejected by neptun's matcher rather than CouchDB, and shows
+up in Obsidian as a connection failure with **no error message at all**.
+
+**2. luna's vault credentials on mars.** `hosts/mars/secrets.nix` needs two
+values before mars will activate: `couchdb_luna_password` and
+`obsidian_luna_passphrase`.
+
+```
+sops --set '["couchdb_luna_password"] "<password>"'   secrets/mars.yaml
+sops --set '["obsidian_luna_passphrase"] "<passphrase>"' secrets/mars.yaml
+```
+
+Keep both alphanumeric. sops substitutes into already-rendered JSON, so a `"`
+or `\` in either produces an invalid `config.json`; the bridge logs
+`Could not parse configuration!` and then runs on with **zero peers** instead
+of exiting, which looks exactly like a bridge that is simply idle.
+
+As set up today these are the `obsidian` admin password and the same
+passphrase as the personal vault, which means mars — the box running an
+autonomous agent — can decrypt and read every vault database. Optional
+hardening, either half independently:
+
+```
+# password comes straight out of sops; never echo it
+LUNA_PW=$(sops --decrypt --extract '["couchdb_luna_password"]' secrets/mars.yaml)
+ADMIN=obsidian                      # prompts for the admin password
+curl -u "$ADMIN" -X PUT http://jupiter.orbit.sol:5984/_users/org.couchdb.user:luna \
+     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+     -d "{\"name\":\"luna\",\"type\":\"user\",\"roles\":[],\"password\":\"$LUNA_PW\"}"
+curl -u "$ADMIN" -X PUT http://jupiter.orbit.sol:5984/luna_wiki/_security \
+     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
+     -d '{"admins":{"names":[],"roles":[]},"members":{"names":["luna"],"roles":[]}}'
+unset LUNA_PW
+```
+
+then set `username` in `hosts/mars/livesync-bridge.nix` to `luna` and put that
+account's password in `couchdb_luna_password`. Run it against jupiter over the
+tailnet — `/_users` is blocked on the public vhost on purpose. A vault-specific
+passphrase is the other half, changed in the plugin and mirrored into sops.
+
+**3. The database name must match.** `database` in
+`hosts/mars/livesync-bridge.nix` has to be exactly the name entered in the
+plugin. A mismatch does not error — with an admin credential PouchDB simply
+creates the misnamed database and replicates an empty vault into it.
+
+Order matters: set the vault up from Obsidian first so the database exists and
+carries the plugin's own tweaks, then deploy mars. Afterwards:
+
+```
+systemctl status livesync-bridge            # on mars
+cat /var/lib/livesync-bridge/health.json    # per-peer ok/backendUp/detail
+ls /var/lib/livesync-bridge/vault           # her notes, as real markdown
+```
+
+The vault is mounted into the agent container at `/opt/data/vault`, inside
+`HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT`, so luna can write as well as read.
+
+A note luna writes reaches CouchDB as soon as the bridge sees it, but whether
+it then reaches your devices depends on that vault's **Sync Mode** in the
+plugin. Only "LiveSync (real-time)" pulls continuously; the periodic/on-save
+presets need their timer or a manual **Replicate**. A file that appears only
+after clicking Replicate is the client waiting, not the bridge failing — the
+database already had it. Check the bridge's own side in the journal:
+
+```
+journalctl -u livesync-bridge | grep -- '--> luna-remote'
+```
+
+⚠️ **Verify her writes actually land before trusting this.** Upstream has three
+open issues on the storage→CouchDB direction (#50, #23, #46) and all fail
+silently — the log reports the upload and the database never updates. Create a
+note as luna, confirm it appears on a phone, and re-check after any input bump.
+
 ### mercury (Raspberry Pi 3B+)
 
 - `./deploy flash mercury /dev/sdX` writes the dedicated age key to the root

flake.lock

@@ -176,6 +176,22 @@
         "url": "https://git.mgaction.town/darman/hypr-chrome.git"
       }
     },
+    "livesync-bridge": {
+      "flake": false,
+      "locked": {
+        "lastModified": 1787571662,
+        "narHash": "sha256-btLnQNbFzCPaSVcY9rtiPdYeXrZjoK9AYvfA9+ovsIc=",
+        "owner": "vrtmrz",
+        "repo": "livesync-bridge",
+        "rev": "c3760beaa0851214da4860903445d7f6420ca025",
+        "type": "github"
+      },
+      "original": {
+        "owner": "vrtmrz",
+        "repo": "livesync-bridge",
+        "type": "github"
+      }
+    },
     "media-manager": {
       "flake": false,
       "locked": {
@@ -490,6 +506,7 @@
         "disko": "disko",
         "home-manager": "home-manager",
         "hypr-chrome": "hypr-chrome",
+        "livesync-bridge": "livesync-bridge",
         "mediamanager-nix": "mediamanager-nix",
         "nix-flatpak": "nix-flatpak",
         "nixos-anywhere": "nixos-anywhere",

flake.nix

@@ -31,6 +31,18 @@
       url = "github:strangeglyph/mediamanager-nix";
       inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
     };
+    # livesync-bridge — headless CouchDB <-> filesystem sync for Obsidian
+    # LiveSync, used on mars to give luna a real directory of markdown
+    # (hosts/mars/livesync-bridge.nix). Not a flake and not in nixpkgs, so it
+    # comes in as plain source pinned by flake.lock; the service copies it out
+    # and runs it under deno. Pinning matters more than usual here — this is a
+    # small third-party project with open bugs on the storage->couchdb path,
+    # so an unreviewed bump could quietly change how the agent's notes are
+    # written back.
+    livesync-bridge = {
+      url = "github:vrtmrz/livesync-bridge";
+      flake = false;
+    };
     authentik-nix.url = "github:nix-community/authentik-nix";
     nix-flatpak.url = "github:gmodena/nix-flatpak";
     # Own Hyprland plugin (border + title bar), public repo, fetched over

hosts/mars/configuration.nix

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
     ./disk-config.nix          # disko: OS-disk partitions + filesystems
     ./secrets.nix              # sops-nix: samba/tailscale/hermes secrets
     ./hermes-agent.nix
+    ./livesync-bridge.nix
     ../../common.nix              # shared base: user / ssh / nix / firewall
     ../../services/containers.nix
     ../../services/vpn/tailscale.nix

hosts/mars/hermes-agent.nix

@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ in
       "${hermesHome}:/opt/data"
       "${dropboxDir}:/opt/data/dropbox"
 
+      # luna's Obsidian vault, kept in sync with CouchDB on jupiter by
+      # livesync-bridge.nix. Under /opt/data so it lands inside
+      # HERMES_WRITE_SAFE_ROOT and she can write notes, not just read them —
+      # same reasoning as the dropbox above. The bridge runs as this very
+      # uid/gid, so no ownership fixup is needed on either side.
+      "/var/lib/livesync-bridge/vault:/opt/data/vault"
+
       # git/tea for luna: the image doesn't ship `tea` (and shouldn't be
       # trusted to have a known-good `git` either), so both come from this
       # host's Nix store instead — mounted read-only at fixed PATH-visible

hosts/mars/livesync-bridge.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,187 @@
+{ config, pkgs, inputs, ... }:
+
+# livesync-bridge (vrtmrz) — mirrors an Obsidian LiveSync vault out of CouchDB
+# on jupiter (services/dev/obsidian-livesync.nix) into a real directory of
+# markdown here, so luna can read and write the vault as files. Obsidian itself
+# is an Electron GUI with no headless mode, and an agent wants files anyway.
+#
+# ⚠️ THE WRITE-BACK PATH IS THE RISKY ONE. Upstream has three open, unanswered
+# issues on storage->couchdb — #50 (Jun 2026, writes detected and logged as
+# uploaded, database never updated), #23 (only lowercase filenames transmitted
+# from storage), #46 (silent stall on files over ~30KB). All fail QUIETLY: the
+# log says success and the note never arrives. So do not treat this directory
+# as durable storage for anything luna cannot regenerate, and check that her
+# edits actually reach your devices before trusting it. (E2EE itself is fine —
+# PeerCouchDB.ts hard-errors if a passphrase is missing for an encrypted
+# remote, so it is a deliberate code path. The one issue claiming E2EE breaks
+# bridging, #12, is a single unreproduced report with no maintainer reply.)
+#
+#
+# EXPECTED NOISE ON FIRST SYNC: a stack trace per historically-deleted file —
+#   NotFound: ... remove '<vault>/Welcome.md'   at PeerStorage.delete
+# CouchDB keeps deletion tombstones, and the bridge replays them against a
+# directory where the file never existed. PeerStorage.ts:33-40 catches it,
+# logs, and returns false, so nothing is wrong; it only LOOKS fatal because
+# main.ts pins the logger to LOG_LEVEL_DEBUG, which prints exception dumps
+# that are otherwise verbose-level. It stops once the initial catch-up ends.
+# Talks to CouchDB over the TAILNET (jupiter.orbit.sol:5984), not through
+# neptun: mars is a tailnet node, so the public vhost, its TLS and its path
+# allowlist are all irrelevant here.
+let
+  stateDir = "/var/lib/livesync-bridge";
+  appDir = "${stateDir}/app";
+  vaultDir = "${stateDir}/vault";
+
+  # The same uid/gid the hermes-agent container runs as (hermes-agent.nix).
+  # Deliberate: the bridge and luna both read and write these files, and
+  # sharing one uid removes any dependence on the container's umask. Two
+  # different uids in a shared group only works while every file stays
+  # group-writable, and a single 0644 file dropped by the agent would stall
+  # sync on that path with nothing but a permission error in the log.
+  hermesUid = 986;
+
+  # Which vault. `group` is what pairs the two peers — both must match or the
+  # bridge starts cleanly and simply never syncs anything.
+  #
+  # ⚠️ `database` must be the name entered in the Obsidian plugin for luna's
+  # vault. Get it wrong and nothing errors: the credential below is CouchDB's
+  # admin, so PouchDB CREATES the misnamed database and replicates an empty
+  # vault into it quite happily.
+  peerGroup = "luna";
+  database = "luna_wiki";
+in
+{
+  # hermes-agent.nix declares the GROUP (gid 983) but no user: the container
+  # brings its own uid and needs no host account. The bridge does need one to
+  # run as, so the matching user is declared here.
+  users.users.hermes = {
+    uid = hermesUid;
+    group = "hermes";
+    isSystemUser = true;
+    home = stateDir;
+    description = "Hermes agent uid, shared with the livesync-bridge service";
+  };
+
+  # Created here rather than by the service so they exist before anything
+  # tries to use them:
+  #   - vaultDir before podman-hermes-agent starts, because a bind-mount
+  #     source that does not exist is created by podman as root:root and the
+  #     bridge then cannot write into its own vault;
+  #   - appDir because WorkingDirectory applies to ExecStartPre as well, so a
+  #     missing one fails the unit before preStart ever gets to create it.
+  systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
+    "d ${vaultDir} 0770 hermes hermes -"
+    "d ${appDir} 0750 hermes hermes -"
+    "d ${stateDir}/deno 0750 hermes hermes -"
+  ];
+
+  # The bridge's peer config, rendered by sops because it carries three
+  # secrets inline (CouchDB password + both passphrases) and the file format
+  # has no include mechanism.
+  #
+  # ⚠️ sops substitutes placeholders into the ALREADY-RENDERED json, so a
+  # secret containing a double quote or a backslash produces an invalid config
+  # and the bridge logs "Could not parse configuration!" and then sits there
+  # with zero peers — it does not exit. Keep all three values alphanumeric.
+  sops.templates."livesync-bridge.json" = {
+    owner = "hermes";
+    content = builtins.toJSON {
+      peers = [
+        {
+          type = "couchdb";
+          name = "luna-remote";
+          group = peerGroup;
+          url = "http://jupiter.orbit.sol:5984";
+          inherit database;
+          username = "obsidian";
+          password = config.sops.placeholder.couchdb_luna_password;
+          passphrase = config.sops.placeholder.obsidian_luna_passphrase;
+          # The plugin derives path obfuscation from the same passphrase it
+          # uses for content, so this is the same secret. Split into its own
+          # field because the bridge takes them separately — if paths come
+          # back as garbage while contents decode fine, this is the field that
+          # is wrong.
+          obfuscatePassphrase = config.sops.placeholder.obsidian_luna_passphrase;
+          # Reads the chunking tweaks the plugin stored in the remote, instead
+          # of guessing sizes that then disagree with every other client.
+          useRemoteTweaks = true;
+          baseDir = "";
+        }
+        {
+          type = "storage";
+          name = "luna-vault";
+          group = peerGroup;
+          baseDir = vaultDir;
+          # Catch up on anything that changed while the service was down.
+          scanOfflineChanges = true;
+          useChokidar = true;
+        }
+      ];
+    };
+  };
+
+  systemd.services.livesync-bridge = {
+    description = "Obsidian LiveSync bridge (CouchDB <-> ${vaultDir})";
+    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
+    after = [ "network-online.target" "tailscaled.service" ];
+    wants = [ "network-online.target" ];
+
+    environment = {
+      # Persistent module + npm cache. Without a fixed DENO_DIR the service
+      # re-downloads its whole dependency tree on every start.
+      DENO_DIR = "${stateDir}/deno";
+      # main.ts reads this instead of ./dat/config.json, which keeps the
+      # secret out of the copied source tree entirely.
+      LSB_CONFIG = config.sops.templates."livesync-bridge.json".path;
+      LSB_HEALTH_FILE = "${stateDir}/health.json";
+      HOME = stateDir;
+    };
+
+    # Copy the pinned source out of the store and install its locked deps.
+    # It cannot run from /nix/store directly: deno.jsonc sets
+    # `nodeModulesDir: manual` with byonm, so `deno install` must write a
+    # node_modules/ next to the sources.
+    #
+    # The copy target is a FIXED path on purpose. Deno keys localStorage —
+    # which is where the bridge records per-file sync state (Peer.ts:119) — by
+    # the main module's origin, and stores it under
+    # DENO_DIR/location_data/<sha of that origin>. VERIFIED by running the same
+    # source from two paths against one DENO_DIR: two separate origin dirs
+    # appear. Running straight from /nix/store would therefore change the
+    # origin on every input bump and silently reset the bridge to a full
+    # rescan of both peers.
+    #
+    # Guarded by a stamp file so this is a no-op on ordinary restarts; only a
+    # flake input bump pays for the re-install (which needs network).
+    preStart = ''
+      set -eu
+      stamp=${stateDir}/.src
+      if [ "$(cat "$stamp" 2>/dev/null || true)" != "${inputs.livesync-bridge}" ]; then
+        # Contents only — appDir is this unit's WorkingDirectory, and
+        # deleting the cwd out from under deno breaks the install below.
+        find ${appDir} -mindepth 1 -delete
+        cp -r ${inputs.livesync-bridge}/. ${appDir}/
+        chmod -R u+w ${appDir}
+        ${pkgs.deno}/bin/deno install --frozen
+        printf '%s' "${inputs.livesync-bridge}" > "$stamp"
+      fi
+    '';
+
+    serviceConfig = {
+      User = "hermes";
+      Group = "hermes";
+      StateDirectory = "livesync-bridge";
+      WorkingDirectory = appDir;
+      # `deno task run` is `deno run -A main.ts`; invoked directly so the
+      # task runner is not in the supervision path.
+      ExecStart = "${pkgs.deno}/bin/deno run -A main.ts";
+      # main.ts installs an unhandledrejection guard, but a genuinely dead
+      # process should still come back rather than trip the start limit.
+      Restart = "always";
+      RestartSec = 30;
+      # Group-writable output, so the two identities stay interchangeable if
+      # the uid sharing above is ever unpicked.
+      UMask = "0007";
+    };
+  };
+}

hosts/mars/secrets.nix

@@ -65,4 +65,36 @@
   # so they're visible inside the container at /opt/data/....
   # restartUnits re-provisions both on rotation, without a full mars deploy.
   sops.secrets.gitea_luna_token.restartUnits = [ "hermes-agent-prepare-dirs.service" ];
+
+  # livesync-bridge (livesync-bridge.nix) — luna's Obsidian vault, mirrored
+  # out of CouchDB on jupiter. Both values are consumed by the rendered
+  # config.json rather than read directly, so the sops default of root:root
+  # 0400 is correct here; only the TEMPLATE needs an owner (set where it is
+  # defined, next to the vault path it references).
+  #
+  # couchdb_luna_password holds jupiter's `obsidian` ADMIN password — the same
+  # value as secrets/jupiter.yaml's couchdb_admin_password — and
+  # obsidian_luna_passphrase is the same passphrase as the personal vault.
+  # That is a deliberate choice to reuse what already existed, but it is worth
+  # being clear about what it costs: mars can decrypt and read EVERY vault
+  # database, not just luna's, and mars is the box running an autonomous
+  # agent. The two are independent to fix, cheapest first:
+  #
+  #   1. A vault-specific passphrase (re-encrypts luna's remote database, but
+  #      leaves the personal vault's contents unreadable from here).
+  #   2. A CouchDB account scoped to luna's database via _security (three curl
+  #      calls, in README -> "Obsidian vaults"), which also stops mars from
+  #      reaching the other databases at all.
+  #
+  # Neither is required for the bridge to work; both shrink the blast radius
+  # if mars is ever compromised.
+  sops.secrets.couchdb_luna_password = { };
+
+  # The E2EE passphrase for luna's vault, as entered in the Obsidian plugin.
+  # Vault passphrases otherwise never leave the clients (see the note in
+  # services/dev/obsidian-livesync.nix) — this one has to be here because mars
+  # IS a client: it decrypts in order to write real markdown to disk. Path
+  # obfuscation uses the same passphrase in the plugin, so the bridge's
+  # separate obfuscatePassphrase field is fed from this one value.
+  sops.secrets.obsidian_luna_passphrase = { };
 }

secrets/mars.yaml

@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ telegram_bot_token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:WX+KFtoqFodkoWNwd7EXUrUJakZ9oaMZgg4OnCeL
 hermes_dashboard_oidc_client_secret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:IMPNTPMKO+b7eyV4hyGfnvH1/i+W4IPDNjncoyB1oIV8WaB6nOJn0sSEuTUCKB94K+Y7bsVQU0zpbKdIYOdGqgmPzwMCsScxMt4SewTmiiqWxv6SQFf4EzMxgXqjMvH8PWDzLcI2C2tI/KcVS251iqRViOTFe1/tkm+mV8sJmEI=,iv:F/rOUDmJZoGPS9fObAni5ntyOqbbhMWDPdHGLTexwlA=,tag:ALf98DmB0JziGspZMiLCiw==,type:str]
 gitea_luna_token: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:0ypW9oVFs1mXYPhPareMFRdkSYcvHSCm+fQOd7/76lJEXi217r9dmg==,iv:j3TPm/iLk6pB6CmDePFBOlnhxWSbmLKvOhz06SM1T7k=,tag:ydErvC2mZ1RRnwNffiHkkg==,type:str]
 gitea_hermes_webhook_secret: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:lV78H0xAehPxusSO/QruOYkt7fkMJrW+ScZL4UWYvgnBGn/D+1XHYPyHCqe2sEEWSlIaAgWMMoZzoVJ1Z1NFVQ==,iv:GmTZxoH2iiL/vTVgPfziXIFYD+Rl3cbh9hqXvWps+iw=,tag:jtXEUOVFfKrpTRK7S9PZMA==,type:str]
+couchdb_luna_password: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:V91is2h7UskI1rtwMzQyduNXoDPTYNwa4sw9K9WU+wE=,iv:k976ImKR19+CvGOVsHsrqMaFFtSQxVi6zABCJuQ5AWE=,tag:W2SN4SET/+o4+Wt6BOJ1LA==,type:str]
+obsidian_luna_passphrase: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:fqHtP3g4J40ddYL9lzCixrisdC/DEJJermE=,iv:FU6BGNcBnyP8Rz3dNBk0+K0aAQTDW6/0aVaFm1rBFkk=,tag:Mg1aKqh++2rmU8ROaVIgDw==,type:str]
 sops:
     age:
         - enc: |
@@ -26,7 +28,7 @@ sops:
             oyJ7PS3lW+PxH5AZkeeU7gXO/pz2oDku0aDOds7kaD3n0+qSWicQ+Q==
             -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
           recipient: age1eapjg6tdrr0fuvmgs3q3nlvnjkaxez298qynqqqxt0lpcv0lrsyq7ayxjk
-    lastmodified: "2026-08-23T05:55:49Z"
-    mac: ENC[AES256_GCM,data:a3vCmrQMCS25tNWrzTeiGmOHf4Fn356PO3uNa2HvS21EBCKTc6YWBj9KmpORdz+6t03JJe/4eiGdghGaLhRr+JXyQnaT54gSV+FhC3dH6blind746XN3h+Z9rxiva6apvcAGUZ9k01Js5IXN9efEMhcI6w0U4oVuVqtvShvg8A8=,iv:9kF3cJ1vyy2H3eH10DVCYmWeXv2MH4AFDiF8cOajlw4=,tag:zhombLVpL8M1TUtYur/gYQ==,type:str]
+    lastmodified: "2026-08-25T21:51:24Z"
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