Commit Graph
20 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
darmanandClaude Opus 5.5 e95726d69c feat(mars): pass-broker approval gateway for every host
A Telegram bot has a single getUpdates consumer, so a broker per host
would split approval taps between them. mars now runs the gateway: the
bot's only poller, relaying prompts and taps for terra's and titan's
brokers over the tailnet (:8097) without ever seeing an item. Each broker
authenticates with its own pass_broker_gateway_token; mars holds only the
sha256, and the prompt is labelled with the host that token belongs to.

The bot token and chat id move to mars and are dropped from the other
hosts' sops files (terra.yaml also loses its leftover LibreChat keys and
gains protonvpn_wg_private_key, which a later commit uses). Covered by
checks.pass-broker-gateway (two nodes: labels, cancel, expiry, per-host
token isolation, gateway down); the fakes are shared with checks.pass-broker.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-21 11:34:19 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 5.5 3dccafe2b8 feat(terra): pass-broker for Telegram-approved Proton Pass access
A Rust daemon running as its own system user holds terra's only pass-cli
session, an agent PAT scoped to the HomeLab vaults. `pass-broker get` asks
it for an item; per-item rules decide auto/ask/deny, and "ask" sends a
Telegram prompt that only darman's account can approve (10-min grant for
darman@*/root@*). Requests whose client is gone are dropped or withdrawn,
and the client gives up after 30s without an answer.

scripts/deploy uses the broker exclusively when its socket exists. Covered
by checks.pass-broker (fake pass-cli + Telegram). Secrets added for all
hosts; only terra runs the broker so far.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-16 01:48:46 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 5 15ae1cf608 obsidian: self-hosted vault sync via CouchDB on jupiter
Adds services/dev/obsidian-livesync.nix — CouchDB 3 from the native
nixpkgs module, tuned as the backend for the Self-hosted LiveSync plugin
— and publishes it as notes.mgaction.town through neptun.

It goes out over the public reverse proxy rather than staying on the LAN
because Obsidian's mobile apps refuse cleartext HTTP and *.jupiter.sol
cannot hold a publicly trusted cert. That makes the hardening load-bearing
rather than decorative:

  - require_valid_user in both [chttpd] and [chttpd_auth], so nothing
    answers unauthenticated on the open internet;
  - neptun's vhost matches on CouchDB's own naming rule (system endpoints
    all begin with `_`, user databases never can), so Fauxton, /_all_dbs
    and /_node/_local/_config — which rewrites the server config given
    admin credentials — 404 at the proxy while any number of per-vault
    databases pass. Verified against both sets of paths with caddy run
    against a stub backend;
  - the plugin's own E2EE carries the actual confidentiality: jupiter only
    ever stores ciphertext. Its passphrase is deliberately NOT in sops —
    it never leaves the clients, and pairing it with the server credential
    would defeat the point.

flush_interval -1 is required, not tuning: replication rides a continuous
_changes feed that caddy would otherwise buffer into a stall.

Storage sits on the array with RequiresMountsFor, since a CouchDB that
starts without /mnt/data would create an empty database on the eMMC and
LiveSync would replicate that emptiness back to every client. Logs go to
journald rather than the unrotated /var/log/couchdb.log, for the same
29G-eMMC reasons as the rest of jupiter.

The admin password reaches CouchDB as an [admins] ini fragment via
extraConfigFiles; services.couchdb.adminPass would have rendered it into
the world-readable store.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TLN5nkLBtCciD3ZnUwtw2b
2026-08-25 23:25:37 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 5 d0aec5b061 secrets: add gitea_hermes_webhook_secret to mars + jupiter
Shared HMAC secret for the Gitea -> Hermes webhook relay merged in #2. Both
hosts need the same value: jupiter signs deliveries with it (the webhook
config registered by gitea-hermes-webhook-provision), and mars verifies them
in the relay and hands it to Hermes through the hermes-agent.env template.

32 random bytes, hex-encoded, stored with no trailing newline — the value
reaches Hermes via an env-file template where a newline would both corrupt
the file and change the key the HMAC is computed with.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S94o42aQ8VkBmEWvDem5xa
2026-08-23 05:18:58 +02:00
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 7d63ba95df add mars host, move Hermes Agent there from jupiter
New on-site host mars runs Hermes Agent as its sole service: joins the
tailnet, mounts jupiter's samba share at /mnt/jupiter (doubling as
Hermes's shared dropbox), and hosts state locally under /var/lib/hermes.
Same Authentik OIDC app/Telegram bot as before, just relocated — neptun's
hermes.mgaction.town vhost now points at mars.orbit.sol instead of jupiter.

hosts/jupiter/hermes-agent.nix and its three sops secrets are removed;
jupiter's Caddy vhost for it is gone too. Also refreshes tailscale_authkey
across all hosts and fixes two stale "erik@laptop" keys in flake.nix's
kexec/installer-iso images (leftover from a previous laptop, already
swapped out of common.nix back in 2fd5752) to darman@terra.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011FHr5ug9pu8q4XPrRkFnzJ
2026-08-22 03:00:24 +02:00
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 b5fa599671 jupiter: add isolated Hermes Agent instance
A separate instance from terra's, deliberately locked down harder given
jupiter's much bigger blast radius (irreplaceable immich photos on an
unredundant RAID0, gitea/CI tokens, the whole media stack): its own
dedicated "hermes" system user rather than darman (who is in jupiter's
root-equivalent docker group), container.enable = true for whole-process
containment rather than native/bare-metal, its own Telegram bot + explicit
allowlist, and no volume access to /mnt/data or this repo. stateDir/
workingDirectory live on the array (off the 29G eMMC) for future coding-task
state, guarded by RequiresMountsFor like the rest of jupiter's array-backed
services.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 22:46:32 +02:00
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 0fa567245a jupiter: GC on every boot, silence mdadm warning, migrate sabnzbd off reused ini
nix.gc (common.nix) is weekly, too slow to catch a switch pinning the old
generation's closure on a 29G eMMC — add a full nix-collect-garbage on every
boot instead. Also set boot.swraid.mdadmConf so eval stops warning that
mdmon will crash (dormant here: the RAID0 array uses native superblocks, so
mdmon never actually runs).

sabnzbd.configFile is deprecated by the module; move to services.sabnzbd.settings
with credentials (web login, api/nzb keys, eweka.nl server) sourced from sops via
secretValues instead of living in a plaintext ini. admin_dir/log_dir are pinned
absolute at their original /mnt/data location so the existing download
queue/history isn't reset by the ini moving to /var/lib/sabnzbd.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 20:58:40 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 5 5a4588c532 gitea: provision a ci-bot account with repo + branch-protection access
Workflows push as a dedicated ci-bot account rather than a human one, so its
PAT can be scoped, rotated and revoked on its own. Adding a repo to
`ciBotRepos` and redeploying is all it takes to grant access.

Collaborator access and branch-protection push-whitelisting exist only on
gitea's HTTP API — no CLI, no config-file surface — so this one part stays
imperative: a oneshot that PUT/PATCHes the API into the desired state. It
runs on deploys where the script changed, which means it won't self-heal a
revert done through the web UI unless the unit is restarted too.

Two secrets, deliberately distinct:
- gitea_provisioning_token is darman's own token (write:repository +
  write:user). Only an owner-scoped token clears reqOwnerCheck on the
  collaborator and branch-protection endpoints, and write:user is what lets
  it write the Actions secret below. ci-bot cannot grant itself access.
- gitea_ci_bot_token is ci-bot's push token, generated once by hand (the
  command is in the comment) and pushed into gitea as a user-level Actions
  secret CI_BOT_TOKEN. Gitea has no instance-wide secret scope, and every
  repo here is owned by darman directly rather than an org, so a user-level
  secret is the closest thing — repo-level lookups fall back to it.

Branch protection is applied to the default branch plus `develop`, since
version-bump.yml pushes there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 03:32:28 +02:00
darman 63ca6f8409 jupiter: enable gitea Actions + register a jupiter runner
Runner registers against the same gitea instance and runs jobs in podman
containers (services/containers.nix), one image per runs-on label using the
catthehacker act-compatible images. Registration token comes from gitea
itself (gitea actions generate-runner-token) and is stored in
secrets/jupiter.yaml, rendered into a TOKEN=... env file via sops.templates
since gitea-actions-runner takes an EnvironmentFile, not a raw secret path.
2026-07-29 21:43:05 +02:00
Erik Simon d43709536c updated tailscale auth keys 2026-07-25 01:32:00 +02:00
darman a4c7768625 immich: fix OIDC clientId, redirect logout to immich's own login page
clientId was still the placeholder "immich" instead of Authentik's actual
generated id, and the sops secret it points at (immich_oauth_client_secret)
was never declared on jupiter. Wire both up, and set endSessionEndpoint so
logout lands back on immich instead of Authentik's "logged out" page.
2026-07-23 23:14:11 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 4.8 564dfb16b8 headscale: add OIDC login, stop overriding clients' local DNS
Two changes to the control server, plus the fallout on the hosts.

OIDC via Authentik, so `tailscale up --login-server ...` opens a browser
instead of needing a pre-auth key. This is a second Authentik application,
separate from headplane's, with headscale's own /oidc/callback redirect.
Headless hosts keep using pre-auth keys. Note that headscale runs OIDC
discovery at startup and a failure is FATAL -- pointing `issuer` at an
application that does not exist yet means the control server will not
boot, so verify the discovery document before deploying.

override_local_dns = false, because the upstream default of true replaces
resolv.conf with 100.100.100.100 on every node. That silently broke the
LAN's `.sol` names -- pihole serves those and the global nameservers
return NXDOMAIN for them -- and took ad blocking down with them. It also
made each node's entire DNS depend on tailscaled, which is what had
forced --accept-dns=false onto neptun and mercury individually; both of
those workarounds are now removed, and with MagicDNS resolving properly
again neptun no longer needs its hardcoded /etc/hosts pin for jupiter.

Also serves jellyfin and seerr from jupiter, matching the ports they
already use on its LAN vhosts, and rotates the tailnet pre-auth keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 21:12:31 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 4.8 d9e6b6b697 headplane: point OIDC at the real Authentik app; rotate tailnet keys
The Authentik provider and application now exist (slug "headplane", which
is what makes the issuer .../application/o/headplane/), so the client ID
is a real value rather than a placeholder, and the client secret and
headscale API key are in sops.

The tailscale pre-auth keys for neptun and jupiter are rotated because
the tailnet was recreated from scratch: the old headscale database went
with the VPS's OS disk, so every key issued against it is meaningless to
the new control server.

Note the headscale API key defaults to a 90d expiry. When it lapses
headplane stops listing nodes with no obvious cause -- `headscale apikeys
list` shows the date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 19:41:40 +02:00
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 69a63dc615 Add *arr media stack + Gitea to jupiter
- sabnzbd, prowlarr, sonarr, radarr, clonarr, seerr, cinephage, mediamanager
  services, wired into jupiter with LAN Caddy vhosts.
- Gitea: migrated the old ZimaOS docker instance's data (sqlite db, 4 repos,
  no LFS objects) into the NixOS module's default stateDir layout. HTTP via
  Caddy; git SSH on its own built-in server at :2222 (not :222 - the unpriv
  gitea user can't bind <1024).
- mediamanager-nix flake input for the mediamanager service.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 21:27:50 +02:00
erik 25c6982cea feat(audiobookshelf): bind 0.0.0.0 so it's reachable over tailscale (VPS proxy) 2026-07-13 00:26:16 +02:00
erik 5dddc9d2fb feat: tailscale via headscale (vpn.mgaction.town) + fix audiobookshelf extraGroups syntax
- services.tailscale auto-registers with headscale using a sops pre-auth key
- trust tailscale0 so LAN services are reachable over the tailnet
- fix missing semicolon on audiobookshelf extraGroups
2026-07-13 00:17:41 +02:00
erik 5239f1ce71 chore: set real samba + darman secrets; edit_secrets zeditor support 2026-07-12 21:35:58 +02:00
erikandClaude Opus 4.8 dd6c4829ad feat: darman login password via sops (hashedPasswordFile)
- add darman_password (sha-512 hash) to secrets/jupiter.yaml
- neededForUsers so it lands in /run/secrets-for-users before user setup
- real host uses hashedPasswordFile; VM keeps its test initialPassword

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 21:22:00 +02:00
erikandClaude Opus 4.8 f9358375b5 feat: sops decrypts via pre-generated SSH host key (works on boot #1)
- pre-generate jupiter SSH host key off-repo (~/.config/homelab/jupiter)
- derive age recipient via ssh-to-age, add to .sops.yaml, re-encrypt secret
- secrets.nix: sops.age.sshKeyPaths = host key (drop separate keyFile)
- gitignore private-key patterns
- README: ship host key via nixos-anywhere --extra-files; secret decrypts boot #1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 20:48:33 +02:00
erikandClaude Opus 4.8 10387fdbee feat: sops-nix for samba password secret
- add sops-nix input + module (jupiter only, not the VM)
- secrets/jupiter.yaml: age-encrypted samba_password (safe to commit)
- .sops.yaml: encryption rule for admin age key
- secrets.nix: decrypt samba_password to /run/secrets on the host
- provisioning oneshot reads sops secret (host) or plaintext (VM), single value
- .sops private key stays off-repo (~/.config, /var/lib/sops-nix on host)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 20:16:17 +02:00