Commit Graph
15 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 b5fa599671 jupiter: add isolated Hermes Agent instance
A separate instance from terra's, deliberately locked down harder given
jupiter's much bigger blast radius (irreplaceable immich photos on an
unredundant RAID0, gitea/CI tokens, the whole media stack): its own
dedicated "hermes" system user rather than darman (who is in jupiter's
root-equivalent docker group), container.enable = true for whole-process
containment rather than native/bare-metal, its own Telegram bot + explicit
allowlist, and no volume access to /mnt/data or this repo. stateDir/
workingDirectory live on the array (off the 29G eMMC) for future coding-task
state, guarded by RequiresMountsFor like the rest of jupiter's array-backed
services.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 22:46:32 +02:00
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 0fa567245a jupiter: GC on every boot, silence mdadm warning, migrate sabnzbd off reused ini
nix.gc (common.nix) is weekly, too slow to catch a switch pinning the old
generation's closure on a 29G eMMC — add a full nix-collect-garbage on every
boot instead. Also set boot.swraid.mdadmConf so eval stops warning that
mdmon will crash (dormant here: the RAID0 array uses native superblocks, so
mdmon never actually runs).

sabnzbd.configFile is deprecated by the module; move to services.sabnzbd.settings
with credentials (web login, api/nzb keys, eweka.nl server) sourced from sops via
secretValues instead of living in a plaintext ini. admin_dir/log_dir are pinned
absolute at their original /mnt/data location so the existing download
queue/history isn't reset by the ini moving to /var/lib/sabnzbd.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-19 20:58:40 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 5 5a4588c532 gitea: provision a ci-bot account with repo + branch-protection access
Workflows push as a dedicated ci-bot account rather than a human one, so its
PAT can be scoped, rotated and revoked on its own. Adding a repo to
`ciBotRepos` and redeploying is all it takes to grant access.

Collaborator access and branch-protection push-whitelisting exist only on
gitea's HTTP API — no CLI, no config-file surface — so this one part stays
imperative: a oneshot that PUT/PATCHes the API into the desired state. It
runs on deploys where the script changed, which means it won't self-heal a
revert done through the web UI unless the unit is restarted too.

Two secrets, deliberately distinct:
- gitea_provisioning_token is darman's own token (write:repository +
  write:user). Only an owner-scoped token clears reqOwnerCheck on the
  collaborator and branch-protection endpoints, and write:user is what lets
  it write the Actions secret below. ci-bot cannot grant itself access.
- gitea_ci_bot_token is ci-bot's push token, generated once by hand (the
  command is in the comment) and pushed into gitea as a user-level Actions
  secret CI_BOT_TOKEN. Gitea has no instance-wide secret scope, and every
  repo here is owned by darman directly rather than an org, so a user-level
  secret is the closest thing — repo-level lookups fall back to it.

Branch protection is applied to the default branch plus `develop`, since
version-bump.yml pushes there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 03:32:28 +02:00
darman 63ca6f8409 jupiter: enable gitea Actions + register a jupiter runner
Runner registers against the same gitea instance and runs jobs in podman
containers (services/containers.nix), one image per runs-on label using the
catthehacker act-compatible images. Registration token comes from gitea
itself (gitea actions generate-runner-token) and is stored in
secrets/jupiter.yaml, rendered into a TOKEN=... env file via sops.templates
since gitea-actions-runner takes an EnvironmentFile, not a raw secret path.
2026-07-29 21:43:05 +02:00
Erik Simon d43709536c updated tailscale auth keys 2026-07-25 01:32:00 +02:00
darman a4c7768625 immich: fix OIDC clientId, redirect logout to immich's own login page
clientId was still the placeholder "immich" instead of Authentik's actual
generated id, and the sops secret it points at (immich_oauth_client_secret)
was never declared on jupiter. Wire both up, and set endSessionEndpoint so
logout lands back on immich instead of Authentik's "logged out" page.
2026-07-23 23:14:11 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 4.8 564dfb16b8 headscale: add OIDC login, stop overriding clients' local DNS
Two changes to the control server, plus the fallout on the hosts.

OIDC via Authentik, so `tailscale up --login-server ...` opens a browser
instead of needing a pre-auth key. This is a second Authentik application,
separate from headplane's, with headscale's own /oidc/callback redirect.
Headless hosts keep using pre-auth keys. Note that headscale runs OIDC
discovery at startup and a failure is FATAL -- pointing `issuer` at an
application that does not exist yet means the control server will not
boot, so verify the discovery document before deploying.

override_local_dns = false, because the upstream default of true replaces
resolv.conf with 100.100.100.100 on every node. That silently broke the
LAN's `.sol` names -- pihole serves those and the global nameservers
return NXDOMAIN for them -- and took ad blocking down with them. It also
made each node's entire DNS depend on tailscaled, which is what had
forced --accept-dns=false onto neptun and mercury individually; both of
those workarounds are now removed, and with MagicDNS resolving properly
again neptun no longer needs its hardcoded /etc/hosts pin for jupiter.

Also serves jellyfin and seerr from jupiter, matching the ports they
already use on its LAN vhosts, and rotates the tailnet pre-auth keys.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 21:12:31 +02:00
darmanandClaude Opus 4.8 d9e6b6b697 headplane: point OIDC at the real Authentik app; rotate tailnet keys
The Authentik provider and application now exist (slug "headplane", which
is what makes the issuer .../application/o/headplane/), so the client ID
is a real value rather than a placeholder, and the client secret and
headscale API key are in sops.

The tailscale pre-auth keys for neptun and jupiter are rotated because
the tailnet was recreated from scratch: the old headscale database went
with the VPS's OS disk, so every key issued against it is meaningless to
the new control server.

Note the headscale API key defaults to a 90d expiry. When it lapses
headplane stops listing nodes with no obvious cause -- `headscale apikeys
list` shows the date.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-20 19:41:40 +02:00
darmanandClaude Sonnet 5 69a63dc615 Add *arr media stack + Gitea to jupiter
- sabnzbd, prowlarr, sonarr, radarr, clonarr, seerr, cinephage, mediamanager
  services, wired into jupiter with LAN Caddy vhosts.
- Gitea: migrated the old ZimaOS docker instance's data (sqlite db, 4 repos,
  no LFS objects) into the NixOS module's default stateDir layout. HTTP via
  Caddy; git SSH on its own built-in server at :2222 (not :222 - the unpriv
  gitea user can't bind <1024).
- mediamanager-nix flake input for the mediamanager service.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-19 21:27:50 +02:00
erik 25c6982cea feat(audiobookshelf): bind 0.0.0.0 so it's reachable over tailscale (VPS proxy) 2026-07-13 00:26:16 +02:00
erik 5dddc9d2fb feat: tailscale via headscale (vpn.mgaction.town) + fix audiobookshelf extraGroups syntax
- services.tailscale auto-registers with headscale using a sops pre-auth key
- trust tailscale0 so LAN services are reachable over the tailnet
- fix missing semicolon on audiobookshelf extraGroups
2026-07-13 00:17:41 +02:00
erik 5239f1ce71 chore: set real samba + darman secrets; edit_secrets zeditor support 2026-07-12 21:35:58 +02:00
erikandClaude Opus 4.8 dd6c4829ad feat: darman login password via sops (hashedPasswordFile)
- add darman_password (sha-512 hash) to secrets/jupiter.yaml
- neededForUsers so it lands in /run/secrets-for-users before user setup
- real host uses hashedPasswordFile; VM keeps its test initialPassword

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 21:22:00 +02:00
erikandClaude Opus 4.8 f9358375b5 feat: sops decrypts via pre-generated SSH host key (works on boot #1)
- pre-generate jupiter SSH host key off-repo (~/.config/homelab/jupiter)
- derive age recipient via ssh-to-age, add to .sops.yaml, re-encrypt secret
- secrets.nix: sops.age.sshKeyPaths = host key (drop separate keyFile)
- gitignore private-key patterns
- README: ship host key via nixos-anywhere --extra-files; secret decrypts boot #1

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 20:48:33 +02:00
erikandClaude Opus 4.8 10387fdbee feat: sops-nix for samba password secret
- add sops-nix input + module (jupiter only, not the VM)
- secrets/jupiter.yaml: age-encrypted samba_password (safe to commit)
- .sops.yaml: encryption rule for admin age key
- secrets.nix: decrypt samba_password to /run/secrets on the host
- provisioning oneshot reads sops secret (host) or plaintext (VM), single value
- .sops private key stays off-repo (~/.config, /var/lib/sops-nix on host)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-12 20:16:17 +02:00