Adds services/dev/obsidian-livesync.nix — CouchDB 3 from the native
nixpkgs module, tuned as the backend for the Self-hosted LiveSync plugin
— and publishes it as notes.mgaction.town through neptun.
It goes out over the public reverse proxy rather than staying on the LAN
because Obsidian's mobile apps refuse cleartext HTTP and *.jupiter.sol
cannot hold a publicly trusted cert. That makes the hardening load-bearing
rather than decorative:
- require_valid_user in both [chttpd] and [chttpd_auth], so nothing
answers unauthenticated on the open internet;
- neptun's vhost matches on CouchDB's own naming rule (system endpoints
all begin with `_`, user databases never can), so Fauxton, /_all_dbs
and /_node/_local/_config — which rewrites the server config given
admin credentials — 404 at the proxy while any number of per-vault
databases pass. Verified against both sets of paths with caddy run
against a stub backend;
- the plugin's own E2EE carries the actual confidentiality: jupiter only
ever stores ciphertext. Its passphrase is deliberately NOT in sops —
it never leaves the clients, and pairing it with the server credential
would defeat the point.
flush_interval -1 is required, not tuning: replication rides a continuous
_changes feed that caddy would otherwise buffer into a stall.
Storage sits on the array with RequiresMountsFor, since a CouchDB that
starts without /mnt/data would create an empty database on the eMMC and
LiveSync would replicate that emptiness back to every client. Logs go to
journald rather than the unrotated /var/log/couchdb.log, for the same
29G-eMMC reasons as the rest of jupiter.
The admin password reaches CouchDB as an [admins] ini fragment via
extraConfigFiles; services.couchdb.adminPass would have rendered it into
the world-readable store.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01TLN5nkLBtCciD3ZnUwtw2b
129 lines
6.1 KiB
Nix
129 lines
6.1 KiB
Nix
{ config, ... }:
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# CouchDB, tuned as the backend for Obsidian Self-hosted LiveSync
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# (vrtmrz/obsidian-livesync). The plugin replicates the vault into CouchDB
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# chunk-by-chunk over PouchDB's replication protocol, so this is a plain
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# CouchDB 3 node — nothing Obsidian-specific runs here.
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#
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# Published PUBLICLY as https://notes.mgaction.town via neptun's caddy (see
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# hosts/neptun/configuration.nix), because Obsidian's mobile apps refuse
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# cleartext HTTP and jupiter's *.jupiter.sol names cannot get a real cert.
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# That makes the settings below security-relevant, not cosmetic:
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#
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# - `require_valid_user` in BOTH [chttpd] and [chttpd_auth]: without it
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# CouchDB answers unauthenticated GETs on the open internet.
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# - neptun's vhost allowlists only the endpoints the plugin uses, so Fauxton
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# (/_utils) and the cluster/config endpoints are not reachable from
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# outside at all — reach them over the tailnet instead.
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# - Turn ON end-to-end encryption in the plugin (Settings → Remote Database
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# → End-to-End Encryption, plus "Obfuscate Properties", which covers the
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# paths and timestamps that E2EE alone leaves readable). Then this server
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# only ever holds ciphertext, which is what makes a publicly-reachable
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# credentialed database an acceptable trade rather than a bad one.
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#
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# Its passphrase is a SEPARATE secret from couchdb_admin_password below —
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# deliberately, and it must stay that way. The couchdb password
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# authenticates to this server and is stored here (hashed) and in
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# secrets/jupiter.yaml; the E2EE passphrase never leaves the Obsidian
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# clients and CouchDB has no idea it exists. Reusing one string for both
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# hands whoever obtains that credential the decryption key as well, which
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# is precisely the failure E2EE is here to prevent. The passphrase is
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# therefore NOT in sops (nothing on this host consumes it) — it lives in
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# the HomeLab Proton Pass vault, with the deploy credentials.
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#
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# Losing it costs the remote database, not the notes: wipe it and
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# re-initialize from a device that still holds the plaintext vault.
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{
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services.couchdb = {
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enable = true;
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# Listens on all interfaces, same reasoning as immich: :5984 is NOT opened
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# in the firewall, so it is reachable over tailscale0 (trusted in
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# common.nix) and localhost only. That is the path neptun's caddy takes.
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bindAddress = "0.0.0.0";
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port = 5984;
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# The vault database is the ONLY copy of the notes once LiveSync is the
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# source of truth, so it belongs on the array, not the 29G eMMC. All three
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# of these default under /var/lib/couchdb and have to move together —
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# configFile especially, since CouchDB writes to it at runtime (below).
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databaseDir = "/mnt/data/AppData/couchdb";
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viewIndexDir = "/mnt/data/AppData/couchdb";
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configFile = "/mnt/data/AppData/couchdb/local.ini";
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# The admin password, as an [admins] ini fragment from sops.
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# services.couchdb.adminPass would render it into the world-readable
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# store; extraConfigFiles is the module's own documented hook for this
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# (hosts/jupiter/secrets.nix renders the template).
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#
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# ⚠️ CouchDB hashes a plaintext admin password at startup and persists the
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# hash to the LAST, writable file in its ini chain — local.ini above,
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# which then takes precedence over this fragment. So changing the sops
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# value alone does NOT rotate the password: delete the `[admins]` line
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# from /mnt/data/AppData/couchdb/local.ini and restart as well.
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extraConfigFiles = [ config.sops.templates."couchdb-admins.ini".path ];
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# Values taken from LiveSync's own CouchDB setup documentation; the plugin
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# refuses to replicate (or silently truncates) without them.
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extraConfig = {
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couchdb = {
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# Creates _users/_replicator on first boot instead of leaving the node
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# in the un-set-up state where every request 500s.
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single_node = "true";
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# LiveSync splits notes into chunks, but a big pasted image still
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# arrives as one document. 8MB (the default) is too small.
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max_document_size = "50000000";
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};
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chttpd = {
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require_valid_user = "true";
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max_http_request_size = "4294967296";
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enable_cors = "true";
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};
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chttpd_auth = {
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require_valid_user = "true";
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authentication_redirect = "/_utils/session.html";
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};
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httpd = {
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# Makes CouchDB answer 401 with a WWW-Authenticate challenge rather
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# than a bare 401 body — the plugin's basic-auth flow depends on it.
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"WWW-Authenticate" = ''Basic realm="couchdb"'';
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enable_cors = "true";
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};
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# Obsidian is an Electron/Capacitor app, so its requests carry these
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# non-http origins. Without them desktop and mobile both fail CORS
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# preflight and the plugin reports a bare "cannot connect".
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cors = {
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credentials = "true";
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origins = "app://obsidian.md,capacitor://localhost,http://localhost";
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headers = "accept, authorization, content-type, origin, referer";
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methods = "GET, PUT, POST, HEAD, DELETE";
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max_age = "3600";
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};
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# The module points [log] file at /var/log/couchdb.log, which nothing
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# rotates — on a 29G eMMC an info-level log of every replication request
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# is a slow disk-fill. stderr hands it to journald's capped storage
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# instead (the file setting is then ignored).
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log = {
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writer = "stderr";
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level = "warning";
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};
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};
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};
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# /mnt/data/AppData is drwx--x--- darman:users, so the couchdb user needs
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# group "users" just to traverse into its own database dir. The dir itself
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# is created couchdb:couchdb by the module's tmpfiles rule.
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users.users.couchdb.extraGroups = [ "users" ];
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# databaseDir is outside /var/lib, so systemd derives no mount dependency
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# from it. Without this CouchDB starts with the array missing, creates an
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# empty database on the eMMC, and LiveSync sees a remote vault that lost
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# every note — which it would then happily replicate back to the clients.
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systemd.services.couchdb.unitConfig.RequiresMountsFor = [ "/mnt/data" ];
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}
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