Files
homelab/services/dev/gitea.nix
T
darmanandClaude Opus 5 ee3051f6e4 gitea: allow tailnet webhook targets
Webhook delivery to the hermes relay was refused outright:

  Post "http://mars.orbit.sol:8645/gitea/gitea-pr-comments":
  dial tcp 100.64.0.6:8645: webhook can only call allowed HTTP servers
  (check your security.ALLOWED_HOST_LIST setting),
  deny 'mars.orbit.sol(100.64.0.6:8645)'

ALLOWED_HOST_LIST defaults to `external`, documented as "a valid non-private
unicast IP". Tailscale addresses come from 100.64.0.0/10 — RFC 6598
carrier-grade NAT space — which is not RFC1918 private but does not satisfy
gitea's notion of external either, so every tailnet target is denied by
default. Nothing about the relay or the URL was wrong; the request never left
jupiter.

Sets the tailnet CIDR explicitly and keeps `external`, so a future webhook to
a public service still works without another edit here.

Goes in [security], not [webhook]: the webhook-section key is deprecated in
favour of this one and now merely falls back to it, and [security] is the
name the delivery error itself reports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S94o42aQ8VkBmEWvDem5xa
2026-08-23 07:35:03 +02:00

392 lines
18 KiB
Nix

{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
# Gitea — self-hosted git. stateDir/repositories were migrated from the old
# ZimaOS docker instance straight into stateDir's default layout, so no
# import step is needed — just chown it to the gitea user after first deploy
# (currently darman:users from the CIFS copy):
# chown -R gitea:gitea /mnt/data/AppData/gitea
#
# HTTP is reverse-proxied through Caddy (hosts/jupiter/configuration.nix).
# SSH uses gitea's own built-in server on :2222 (not the host's :22, and not
# :222 — the unpriv gitea user can't bind <1024).
let
# Repos where the ci-bot account (see below) should be a Write collaborator
# and whitelisted to push past branch protection. Add a repo here and
# redeploy — no manual UI clicking needed.
ciBotRepos = [ "darman/hypr-chrome" ];
# Repos where luna (Hermes Agent's own gitea identity — see below) gets PR-tier
# access: Write collaborator (so she can push feature branches and open PRs)
# but explicitly walled off `master`'s push/merge/approve whitelists so
# nothing she does lands without darman clicking merge.
lunaRepos = [ "darman/homelab" ];
# Forward every Gitea event to the generic Mars relay. Hermes owns the
# decision about which events matter and what to do with them.
giteaWebhookEvents = [
"create"
"delete"
"fork"
"push"
"issues"
"issue_assign"
"issue_label"
"issue_milestone"
"issue_comment"
"pull_request"
"pull_request_assign"
"pull_request_label"
"pull_request_milestone"
"pull_request_comment"
"pull_request_review_approved"
"pull_request_review_rejected"
"pull_request_review_comment"
"pull_request_sync"
"pull_request_review_request"
"wiki"
"repository"
"release"
"package"
"status"
"workflow_run"
"workflow_job"
];
in
{
services.gitea = {
enable = true;
stateDir = "/mnt/data/AppData/gitea";
lfs.enable = true;
settings = {
repository = {
DEFAULT_BRANCH = "master";
};
server = {
DOMAIN = "git.mgaction.town";
SSH_DOMAIN = "git.mgaction.town";
# https, not http: neptun's Caddy terminates TLS for this name. Gitea
# builds its absolute URLs (clone buttons, redirects, webhooks) from
# ROOT_URL, so an http:// value hands out downgraded links.
ROOT_URL = "https://git.mgaction.town/";
HTTP_PORT = 3000;
START_SSH_SERVER = true;
SSH_PORT = 2222;
SSH_LISTEN_PORT = 2222;
};
service = {
DISABLE_REGISTRATION = true;
};
security = {
# Gitea refuses to deliver a webhook to any host outside this list,
# which defaults to `external` — "a valid non-private unicast IP".
# Tailscale addresses are 100.64.0.0/10 (RFC 6598 carrier-grade NAT),
# which is neither RFC1918 private nor, as far as gitea's matcher is
# concerned, external — so the hermes relay on mars was refused with
# deny 'mars.orbit.sol(100.64.0.6:8645)'
# even though nothing here is private in the RFC1918 sense. Adding
# the tailnet CIDR is what makes tailnet-internal webhook targets
# deliverable at all; `external` is kept so a future webhook to a
# public service (discord, slack) still works without another edit.
#
# This lives in [security], not [webhook]: the webhook-section key is
# deprecated and now just falls back to this one, which is the name
# the delivery error itself reports.
ALLOWED_HOST_LIST = "external,100.64.0.0/10";
};
actions = {
ENABLED = true;
};
};
};
networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 2222 ];
users.users.gitea.extraGroups = [ "users" ];
# Runner instance registered against this same gitea. Jobs run in containers
# (podman, via services/containers.nix — already enabled on jupiter), one
# image per requested `runs-on` label using the catthehacker act-compatible
# images (same ones upstream `act`/Forgejo docs recommend).
#
# tokenFile points at an env file rendered by sops (TOKEN=<registration
# token>, see hosts/jupiter/secrets.nix) rather than a plain `token`, so the
# secret never lands in the Nix store. The registration token itself is NOT
# generated by this module — it comes from gitea once Actions is enabled:
# su gitea -s /bin/sh -c \
# 'GITEA_WORK_DIR=/mnt/data/AppData/gitea gitea actions generate-runner-token'
# then written into secrets/jupiter.yaml as gitea_runner_token.
services.gitea-actions-runner.instances.jupiter = {
enable = true;
name = "jupiter";
url = "https://git.mgaction.town/";
tokenFile = config.sops.templates."gitea-runner.env".path;
labels = [
"ubuntu-latest:docker://ghcr.io/catthehacker/ubuntu:act-latest"
"ubuntu-22.04:docker://ghcr.io/catthehacker/ubuntu:act-22.04"
];
};
# ci-bot: dedicated account CI workflows push as (kept separate from any
# human account so its own PAT can be scoped/rotated/revoked independently).
# Collaborator access + branch-protection push-whitelisting have no CLI or
# config-file surface in gitea — only the HTTP API — so this is the one
# part of the setup that stays imperative even though it's nix-triggered:
# a oneshot that PUTs/PATCHes the API into the desired state on every
# deploy where its script changed (adding a repo to `ciBotRepos` and
# redeploying is enough to pick it up; it won't self-heal a manual revert
# done via the web UI unless the unit is also restarted).
#
# Auth for those API calls is darman's OWN token (named
# "jupiter-ci-bot-provisioning" in gitea, scopes write:repository +
# write:user — see hosts/jupiter/secrets.nix), since darman owns the repos
# in ciBotRepos and only an owner-scoped token clears the reqOwnerCheck on
# the collaborator/branch-protection endpoints; write:user is additionally
# needed to push ci-bot's token below as a secret on darman's own account.
# It is NOT ci-bot's own push token — ci-bot can't grant itself access.
#
# ci-bot's own push token (separate secret, ci_bot_token) is generated
# once via:
# su gitea -s /bin/sh -c \
# 'GITEA_WORK_DIR=/mnt/data/AppData/gitea gitea admin user generate-access-token \
# --username ci-bot --scopes write:repository'
# and this service pushes it into gitea itself as a user-level Actions
# secret (CI_BOT_TOKEN, on darman's account — see the PUT below) so
# workflows in ciBotRepos can push as ci-bot without a per-repo secret.
systemd.services.gitea-ci-bot-provision = {
description = "Provision ci-bot gitea account + repo access";
after = [ "gitea.service" ];
requires = [ "gitea.service" ];
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
path = [ pkgs.curl pkgs.jq config.services.gitea.package ];
environment = {
TOKEN_FILE = config.sops.secrets.gitea_provisioning_token.path;
CI_BOT_TOKEN_FILE = config.sops.secrets.gitea_ci_bot_token.path;
};
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
User = config.services.gitea.user;
};
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
api=http://127.0.0.1:${toString config.services.gitea.settings.server.HTTP_PORT}/api/v1
admin_token="$(cat "$TOKEN_FILE")"
auth=(-H "Authorization: token $admin_token")
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
curl -fs "$api/version" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
sleep 1
done
if ! curl -fs "''${auth[@]}" "$api/users/ci-bot" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
GITEA_WORK_DIR=${config.services.gitea.stateDir} gitea admin user create \
--username ci-bot \
--email ci-bot@${config.services.gitea.settings.server.DOMAIN} \
--random-password --must-change-password=false
fi
# No instance-wide secret scope exists in Gitea (it's an open feature
# request) - a user-level secret on darman's own account is the closest
# equivalent, since every repo below is owned directly by darman, not
# an org, and repo-level secrets fall back to user-level when unset.
ci_bot_token="$(cat "$CI_BOT_TOKEN_FILE")"
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X PUT "$api/user/actions/secrets/CI_BOT_TOKEN" \
-d "$(jq -n --arg data "$ci_bot_token" '{data: $data}')"
${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (repo: ''
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X PUT "$api/repos/${repo}/collaborators/ci-bot" \
-d '{"permission":"write"}'
default_branch="$(curl -fs "''${auth[@]}" "$api/repos/${repo}" | jq -r .default_branch)"
# ci-bot needs push access on every branch a workflow might commit
# back to (currently just `develop`, where version-bump.yml pushes),
# in addition to whatever the repo's actual default branch is.
branches="$(printf '%s\n' "$default_branch" develop | sort -u)"
for branch in $branches; do
if curl -fs "''${auth[@]}" "$api/repos/${repo}/branch_protections/$branch" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X PATCH "$api/repos/${repo}/branch_protections/$branch" \
-d '{"enable_push":true,"enable_push_whitelist":true,"push_whitelist_usernames":["ci-bot"]}'
else
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST "$api/repos/${repo}/branch_protections" \
-d "{\"branch_name\":\"$branch\",\"enable_push\":true,\"enable_push_whitelist\":true,\"push_whitelist_usernames\":[\"ci-bot\"]}"
fi
done
'') ciBotRepos}
'';
};
# luna: Hermes Agent's own gitea identity (Hermes was renamed L.U.N.A.,
# 2026-08-22). Deliberately PR-tier only, not push-tier like ci-bot:
# Hermes runs on mars, takes instructions over Telegram, and can be
# prompt-injected via tool output — a dedicated account with its own
# scoped, revocable token keeps that blast radius off darman's own
# credentials, and the branch-protection whitelists below keep it off
# `master` entirely regardless of what the token can technically do.
# She gets Write collaborator access (needed to push a branch and open a
# PR against the same repo — this instance has no fork workflow), but:
# - enable_push + enable_push_whitelist(darman only): nobody but darman
# can push straight to master; luna can only land on a side branch.
# - enable_merge_whitelist(darman only): opening a PR is not the same
# as merging one — only darman can click merge.
# - required_approvals=1 + enable_approvals_whitelist(darman only):
# an approval has to come from darman specifically, not luna
# rubber-stamping her own PR from a second identity.
# This covers the SERVER side only (account + collaborator + branch
# protection). The client side — git/tea inside the hermes-agent container,
# and the token below — lives in hosts/mars/hermes-agent.nix.
#
# luna's own push token is generated once, the same way ci-bot's was:
# su gitea -s /bin/sh -c \
# 'GITEA_WORK_DIR=/mnt/data/AppData/gitea gitea admin user generate-access-token \
# --username luna --scopes write:repository,write:issue,read:user'
# then stored as a secret (e.g. secrets/mars.yaml's gitea_luna_token) —
# NOT pushed into gitea itself as an Actions secret like ci-bot's is,
# since luna isn't a CI workflow running inside gitea, she's an external
# agent calling out to it.
#
# **write:issue is NOT optional and is easy to miss**: this token started
# life as `write:repository` alone, which clones, fetches and pushes
# branches perfectly well — so everything looks fine right up until the
# first `tea pr create`, which gitea rejects with
# token scope=write:repository,read:user required=read:issue
# A pull request IS an issue in gitea's data model, so every /pulls
# endpoint is gated on the *issue* scope category, not the repository one.
# write:issue covers it (in gitea's scope model write:X implies read:X);
# read:issue alone would satisfy the GET half and then fail the POST that
# actually opens the PR. The error names read:issue only because that's
# the first check tea trips on. Rotating the token is free — the prepare
# oneshot on mars does delete-then-add for the tea login on every start.
systemd.services.gitea-luna-provision = {
description = "Provision luna (Hermes Agent) gitea account + PR-tier repo access";
after = [ "gitea.service" ];
requires = [ "gitea.service" ];
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
path = [ pkgs.curl pkgs.jq config.services.gitea.package ];
environment = {
TOKEN_FILE = config.sops.secrets.gitea_provisioning_token.path;
};
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
User = config.services.gitea.user;
};
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
api=http://127.0.0.1:${toString config.services.gitea.settings.server.HTTP_PORT}/api/v1
admin_token="$(cat "$TOKEN_FILE")"
auth=(-H "Authorization: token $admin_token")
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
curl -fs "$api/version" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
sleep 1
done
if ! curl -fs "''${auth[@]}" "$api/users/luna" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
GITEA_WORK_DIR=${config.services.gitea.stateDir} gitea admin user create \
--username luna \
--email luna@${config.services.gitea.settings.server.DOMAIN} \
--random-password --must-change-password=false
fi
${lib.concatMapStringsSep "\n" (repo: ''
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X PUT "$api/repos/${repo}/collaborators/luna" \
-d '{"permission":"write"}'
default_branch="$(curl -fs "''${auth[@]}" "$api/repos/${repo}" | jq -r .default_branch)"
protect_body="$(jq -n '{
enable_push: true,
enable_push_whitelist: true,
push_whitelist_usernames: ["darman"],
enable_merge_whitelist: true,
merge_whitelist_usernames: ["darman"],
required_approvals: 1,
enable_approvals_whitelist: true,
approvals_whitelist_username: ["darman"]
}')"
if curl -fs "''${auth[@]}" "$api/repos/${repo}/branch_protections/$default_branch" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X PATCH "$api/repos/${repo}/branch_protections/$default_branch" \
-d "$protect_body"
else
curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST "$api/repos/${repo}/branch_protections" \
-d "$(echo "$protect_body" | jq --arg b "$default_branch" '. + {branch_name: $b}')"
fi
'') lunaRepos}
'';
};
# Register the generic Gitea webhook. This is idempotent: it updates the
# existing hook for the relay target or creates it when absent. Event policy
# belongs to Hermes, so the source sends the complete Gitea event set.
systemd.services.gitea-hermes-webhook-provision = {
description = "Provision Gitea webhook for Hermes events";
after = [ "gitea.service" ];
requires = [ "gitea.service" ];
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
path = [ pkgs.curl pkgs.jq ];
environment = {
TOKEN_FILE = config.sops.secrets.gitea_provisioning_token.path;
SECRET_FILE = config.sops.secrets.gitea_hermes_webhook_secret.path;
};
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
User = config.services.gitea.user;
};
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
api=http://127.0.0.1:${toString config.services.gitea.settings.server.HTTP_PORT}/api/v1
admin_token="$(cat "$TOKEN_FILE")"
secret="$(cat "$SECRET_FILE")"
auth=(-H "Authorization: token $admin_token")
# The path carries the Hermes route the relay should forward into, so
# each Hermes subscription gets its own hook here and the relay itself
# stays generic. Adding one is a new subscribe + a new hook URL.
relay="http://mars.orbit.sol:8645"
target="$relay/gitea/gitea-pr-comments"
# This unit only ever creates or updates $target. It deliberately does
# NOT delete anything, including the pre-rename hook on the relay's bare
# path — that is a one-off migration, done by hand, not a thing this
# runs on every boot. See the README for the command.
# Same readiness gate as gitea-ci-bot-provision / gitea-luna-provision
# above: After=gitea.service only means the process started, not that it
# is serving HTTP yet. Without this the first curl below fails under
# `set -e`, and a Type=oneshot with no Restart= stays failed — leaving
# the webhook silently unregistered until someone restarts the unit.
for _ in $(seq 1 30); do
curl -fs "$api/version" >/dev/null 2>&1 && break
sleep 1
done
# The secret goes to curl on stdin (--data @-), never in argv: this unit
# runs as the gitea user on a multi-user box, and a request body passed
# with -d is world-readable in /proc/<pid>/cmdline for its lifetime.
body="$(jq -n --arg url "$target" --arg secret "$secret" \
--argjson events '${builtins.toJSON giteaWebhookEvents}' \
'{type: "gitea", config: {content_type: "json", url: $url, secret: $secret}, events: $events, active: true}')"
hook_id="$(curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" "$api/repos/darman/homelab/hooks" \
| jq -r --arg url "$target" 'first(.[] | select(.type == "gitea" and .config.url == $url)) | .id // empty')"
if [ -n "$hook_id" ]; then
printf '%s' "$body" | curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X PATCH "$api/repos/darman/homelab/hooks/$hook_id" --data @- >/dev/null
else
printf '%s' "$body" | curl -fsS "''${auth[@]}" -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST "$api/repos/darman/homelab/hooks" --data @- >/dev/null
fi
'';
};
}